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460 ZucKERMAN v. UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD's [42 C.2d 
Cal.2d 1 [187 P.2d 752]. It appears that the majority is 
now relying upon the last mentioned case without even citing 
the Hamasaki case. An analysis of the comparative reason-
ing in the Fuentes case and the case at bar with the Hamasaki 
case makes it clear that the rule for which the majority stand 
is that where evidence of liability might have the effect of 
bringing about or increasing an award of damages it is not 
admissible but if it has the effect of reducing or defeating an 
award of damages it is admissible. This line of reasoning 
is out of harmony with my concept of how the law should be 
administered to achieve equal justice. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-It is my view that the opinion 
prepared for the District Court of Appeal by Presiding Jus-
tice Shinn, and concurred in by Justices Wood (Parker) and 
Vallee (reported in (Cal.App.) 258 P.2d 861), adequately 
discusses and correctly resolves all issues of law presented 
by this appeal. For the reasons therein stated I would affir·m 
the judgment. 
[L. A. No. 22668. In Bank. Mar. 12, 1954.] 
EDWARD K. ZUCKERMAN et al., Appellants, v. UNDER-
WRITERS AT LLOYD'S, LONDON (an Association), 
Respondent. 
[1] Insurance-Instructions-Cause of Death.-In action on acci-
dent policies to recover for alleged accidental death of insured 
on ground that death was due to exposure to elements and 
physical exhaustion resulting from accident during fishing trip, 
first two sentences of instruction that beneficiaries have burden 
of proving that death was not directly or indirectly caused 
or contributed to by intentional self-injury, disease or natural 
causes, and that beneficiaries may not recover if evidence 
affirmatively shows that such factors caused or contributed to 
death, unduly stressed significance of any contribution to in-
sured's death by preexisting disease or intentional self-injury, 
but where last sentence of instruction told jurors that 
they were to determine meaning of "caused or contributed to" 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Insurance, § 313; [2] Appeal and 
Error, §1088; [4] Trial, §139(3); [5] Insurance, §269; [6, 7] 
Insurance, § 185 (2) ; [8] Insurance, § 291; [9, 11, 13] Insurance, 
§269; [10] Insurance, §185; [12] Insurance, §§257(2), 269; 
[14, 15, 17] Insurance, § 332; [16] Appeal and Error, § 1166. 
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and "directly or indirectly" from "all of the instructions and 
as a whole," and other instruntions correctly stated e~nditions 
of insurer's it was assumed that J·urors fol}ffl'ved 
! ~ 
the law properly. ~// 
[21 Allege Error-Estoppel.---A party cannot 
complain on of error in an instruction given at request 
of his adversary when an instruction requested by him also 
contains same error. 
[3a, 3b] Insurance-Instructions-Cause of Death.-In action on 
accident policies to recover for alleged accidental death of 
insured on ground that death was due to exposure to elements 
and physical exhaustion resulting from accident during fishing 
trip, an instruction that proximate cause of death is that cause 
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any 
efficient intervening cause, produces death and without which 
the result would not have occurred, and that jury should return 
a verdict for insurer if they find that insured's death would 
have occurred in any event at or about time it did occur, as 
result of intentional self-injuTy, disease or natural causes 
from which he was suffering t;ontinuously before and after 
alleged accident, is proper, when read with other instructions, 
since it merely conversely declares rule which requires bene-
ficiaries to prove that an accident was prime or moving cause 
of death. 
[ 4] Trial-Instructions.-Instructions which are cumulative or 
merely amplifications of other instructions need not be given. 
[5] Insurance-Burden of Proof-Risk and Cause of Loss.-Ordi-
narily the burden is on insurer to prove a true excepted cause 
or excluded risk in order to defeat liability on that ground. 
[6] Id.-Risks and Causes of Loss-Risks Excepted-Intentional 
Injury.-"Intentional self-injury," as used in an accident 
policy, is the antonym of "accidental," and there.fore expresses 
a concept which is antithesis of death occasioned by accident. 
[7] !d.-Risks and Causes of Loss-Risks Excepted-Intentional 
Injury.-Death by suicide reasonably may be said to have been 
eaused by "intentional self-injury." 
[8] Id.-Bvidence-Cause of Death.--In action on accident policy, 
by proof of accident proximately causing death, beneficiary 
necessarily negatives "intentional self-injury." 
[9] !d.-Burden of Proof-Risk and Cause of Loss.--In action 
on accident policy as distinguished from action on life in-
surance policy, burden of suicidt> should not be 
placed on insurer, as provision as to death from that cause is 
not a condition but is mPrcly definitive of precise 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 555; Am.Jur., Appeal 
and Error, § 871 et seq. 
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risk assumed. (Overruling Postle1· v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 
Cal. 1, 158 P. 1022; Mah See v. North American Ace. Ins. Co., 
190 Cal. 421, 213 P. 42; and Housh v. Pacific States Life Ins. 
Co., 2 Cal.App.2d 14, 37 P.2d 41, insofar as these decisions 
are inconsistent with rule stated, on issue of burden of proof.) 
[10] Id.-Risks and Causes of Loss-Risks Excepted-Disease.-
While a rule as to whether or not death caused by disease 
constitutes a true excepted risk cannot be given in general 
terms or by way of broad principles of law, ordinarily the 
insurer, under an accident policy, is not liable for death by 
mere disease even in absence of usual clause expressly ex-
cluding disease from among risks assumed. 
[11] !d.-Instructions-Cause of Death.-In action on accident 
policies to recover for alleged accidental death of insured on 
ground that death was due to exposure to elements and physical 
exhaustion resulting from accident during fishing trip, it was 
not error to instruct on burden of proof in very general terms 
without attempting to define disease, where insurer had not 
urged that beneficiaries' theory was not within scope and in-
tent of policies, and where beneficiaries did not assert that evi-
dence offered by insurer, which tended to show that insured 
was suffering from certain organic conditions, did not con-
stitute "disease." 
[12] !d.-Pleading-Answer: Burden of Proof-Cause of Death.-
A denial that death was occasioned by bodily injury within 
meaning of accident policy is a sufficient plea, and additional 
defense that it was result of intentional self-injury or disease 
does not shift burden of proof to insurer. 
[13] !d.-Instructions-Cause of Death.-In action on accident 
policies to recover for alleged accidental death of insured on 
ground that death was due to exposure to elements and physical 
exhaustion resulting from accident during fishing trip, re-
fusal to instruct on difference between "accidental death" and 
"death by accidental means" is not error where policies do not 
use either term and their provisions are before jury. 
[14] !d.-Appeal- Harmless Error- Instructions.-Where term 
"bodily injury" as used in accident policies was defined for 
jurors by stating express language of policies, and they were 
told that "Bodily injury which shall occasion death" includes 
death by exposure to elements or physical exhaustion or 
drowning from an accident or mechanical or other failure of 
anything used as a means of transportation, no prejudice to 
beneficiaries resulted from refusal to instruct as to other 
meanings of insuring phrase. 
[10] See Cal.Jur., Insurance, § 103; Am.Jur., Insurance, § 995 
et seq. 
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[15a, 15b] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-In action 
on accident policies in one of which insured's brother was 
named beneficiary and in other of which insured's law partner-
ship was named beneficiary, alleged error in submitting issue 
of notice of death to insurer was not prejudicial to either in-
sured's brother or law partnership, and there was no mis-
carriage of justice within meaning of Canst., art. VI, § 4¥2, 
where brother did not know that he was a named beneficiary 
until proximately time that notice was given on behalf of 
partnership and brother, and where it was improbable that 
jury could have found that he failed to comply with provision 
relating to insurer's right to an autopsy. 
[16] Appeal-Presumptions-Instructions.-On appeal it will be 
assumed that jury understood the instructions and applied them 
to evidence. 
(17] Insurance-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-In ac-
tion on accident policies to recover for alleged accidental 
death of insured, insured's brother was not prejudiced by 
submission of insurer's autopsy rights to jury, where brother 
did not order cremation and where he did not know that he 
was a beneficiary under one of policies until at least one week 
after cremation of insured's body; and insured's law partner-
ship, which was named as beneficiary in other policy, was not 
prejudiced by permitting such question to go to jury where 
jury's implied finding was that insured's death did not result 
from a "bodily injury" within meaning of policies. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Robert H. Scott, ,Judge,. Affirmed. 
Action to recover on accident insurance policies. Judg-
ment for defendants affirmed. 
Francis J. Gabel and Henry F. Walker for Appellants. 
Adams, Duque, Davis & Hazeltine and Waller Taylor II, 
for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-Upon trial of the action brought by the 
beneficiaries under two accident insurance policies upon the 
life of George H. Francis, a jury returned verdicts in favor 
of the insurer. As grounds for reversal of the judgment 
denying recovery, it is contended that certain instructions to 
the jury were prejudicially erroneous. 
One of the policies sued upon insured the life of Francis 
in the amount of $100,000 for the benefit of the law firm of 
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which he was a member. A second policy for $75,000 pro-
vided that the insurance should be payable to the law firm 
and to James H. Francis, his brother. 
The answer of the insurer admitted that the policies were 
in effect at the time of the death of Francis but denied lia-
bility thereunder. As separate and affirmative defenses, it 
alleged that death was caused by (1) disease or natural 
causes, and (2) intentional self-injury. 
The evid.ence shows that Francis, a resident of Los An-
geles, went to Mexico on a fishing trip. As the result of a 
storm, the boat used by him and several others in the party 
was unable to return to the mainland and the men spent a 
cold and uncomfortable night on an island. The next day 
Francis complained about not feeling well. He kept himself 
wrapped in blankets and there is considerable evidence that 
he appeared to have frequent chills. However, Stilbert, one 
of the men who accompanied Francis, testified that at no time 
did Francis appear to him to be ill. 
The record includes the testimony that Francis did not go 
to his office on the three days following his return to Los 
Angeles. However, :B'red Paulsen testified that he and 
Francis were together at the latter's ofiice on one of those 
days for one or two hours. He said that Francis ''appeared 
to be in good health, so far as I know.'' Other testimony 
is that during those three days Francis was suffering from 
a cold, evidenced by the symptoms of sneezing and coughing. 
On the third day, Francis consulted a physician and asked 
him to prescribe for a cold. Pursuant to the physician's 
advice, Francis obtained aureomycin and sleeping tablets. 
Francis then decided that his condition would improve if 
he visited his brother who lived on the desert. On the fol-
lowing afternoon, Francis drove to Victorville and parked 
his car in a picnic ground near by. Two days later, he 
was discovered in the car, dead. The car was facing south 
and all of the windows were closed. Francis was lying in the 
back seat in a supine position ·with his head to the east on a 
small pillow. His left arm was down off the seat and the 
right arm was lying across his body. His collar was buttoned 
and his tie intact, as were all of his clothes. As to his 
general appearance, the deputy sheriff who investigated testi-
fied that "he was lying there in a peaceful manner." 'l'he 
keys to the car were in 1<--,rancis' coat pocket. 
An autopsy, not requested by any of the parties, was per-
formed by county autopsy surgeon Baird on the following 
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Monday. Two days later the body was cremated. The record 
does not show at whose order this was done. Some seven to 
12 days after the death of Francis, Norman Pittluck, an 
attorney employed by the law firm, discovered the insurance 
policies and informed Arthur E. Edmunds, one of the part-
ners, of their terms. 
Eleven days after the body of Francis was discovered, 
Underwriters was notified of the death and claim filed for 
payment. Underwriters, pursuant to the provisions of the 
policies, requested permission to perform a post-mortem 
examination. The insurer was informed on April 25th that 
the body had been cremated. 
The testimony as to the cause of death is conflicting and 
extremely technical. The certificate of death, signed by 
Dr. Baird, states: 
"Disease or condition directly leading to death: 
(A) Bronchopneumonia. 
''Antecedent Causes. Morbid conditions, if any giving rise 
to the above cause (A) stating the underlying cause last: 
"Due to (B) Edema of Brain. Due to (C) Acute Alco-
holism.'' 
Dr. Baird testified that he put "acute alcoholism" on the 
death certificate because an acquaintance of the deceased 
informed him that Francis was an alcoholic drinker. Ac-
cording to Dr. Baird, his diagnosis of edema of the brain 
was based solely on the statement made to him that Francis 
used intoxicants. Edema of the brain, said Dr. Baird, re-
sults either from alcohol or injury "and in this case there was 
no evidence of injury.'' His examination was made by 
''gross'' methods, that is, what he could see with his eyes 
and feel with his hands, in contradistinction to microscopic 
study. 
An electrocardiographic tracing made for Francis about 
two years before his death showed that he then had a normal 
heart for a man of his age. Underwriters' medical expert was 
of the opinion that Francis had suffered a ''first degree heart 
block.'' 
Flossie Prancis, the divorced wife of the insured, remained 
on friendly terms with him until his death. She testified 
that he was a heavy drinker and an habitual user of sleeping 
pills. According to her testimony, he did not look well during 
the last months before his death and complained of pain, 
especially in his shoulder. Other witnesses described Francis 
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as ''a heavy but sociable drinker,'' and were o£ the opinion 
that he did not appear to be well. However, several friends 
o£ the deceased told the jury he was in the best o£ health and 
. rarely drank, never to excess. 
The medical expert £or the beneficiaries, in response to a 
hypothetical question, testified that the cause o£ death was 
bronchial pneumonia, and that there ''is nothing in the history 
o£ this case or in the autopsy findings which show that alcohol 
was a causative factor in any way whatsoever.'' A physician 
called by the insurer also was asked a hypothetical question. 
He said that an accurate diagnosis could not be made without 
microscopic studies. In his opinion, Francis did not die o£ 
bronchopneumonia. ''I don't believe this man died o£ 
pneumonia, because i£ you have ever seen a patient die o£ 
pneumonia you have seen a patient who gasps £or breath . . . 
it would be very-very unique £or a man to be lying [supine] 
. . . in a car with his tie in place, with the upper button o£ 
his shirt unopened, lying calmly with the windows shoved 
up. I think most people with pneumonia cry £or air, they 
want the window open, they want the tie off, they want no 
hindrance to respiration.'' He gave as his opinion that the 
primary cause o£ death was a "condition which led to circu-
latory collapse and edema and congestion o£ the lung." As 
his reasons £or that opinion he stated, ''Primarily it occurs, 
o£ course, in acute heart failure ... [it] is the classical find-
ing o£ all these many people who die £rom an overdose o£ 
sleeping pills. Many chemical substances, among which is 
alcohol . . . I could run through a list o£ many poisons which 
can do it.'' 
Except for the amounts of the insurance, the policies are 
identical in form. In part, they provide as follows : 
''A. INSURING CLAUSE: If at any time during the currency 
of this certificate the Assured shall sustain any accidental 
bodily injury . . . caused by . . . Accident, as hereinafter 
defined which shall, solely and independently of any other 
cause within six ( 6) calendar months from the date of the 
accident causing such bodily injury, occasion the disablement 
of the Assured ... the Underwriters will pay to the As-
sured, his Executors, Administrators, or Assigns (or in case 
such bodily injury shall occasion the death of the Assured, 
to the Beneficiary or Beneficiaries named herein) ... : 
"E. DEFINITIONS: It is understood and agreed that: 
"2. 'BoDILY INJURY \VmcH SHALL OccASION DEATH' in-
cludes, in addition to the coverage herein provided, death by 
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exposure to the elements or physical exhaustion or drowning 
resulting from an accident or mechanical or other failure of 
anything used as a means of conveyance or transportation. 
''G. CONDITIONS: 
'' 1. ExcLUSIONS : This certificate does not cover death, 
injury or dismemberment: 
'' (b) Directly or indirectly caused or contributed to by 
intentional self injury disease or natural causes, suicide or 
attempted suicide . . . 
"2. NoTICE oF Loss: Notice in writing must be sent to 
the Underwriters of any accident to the Assured as soon as 
reasonably practicable after the occurrence of the accident 
: . . In the event of death, immediate notice must be sent to 
the Underwriters. In no case will the Underwriters be liable 
to make compensation to the assured or to his representatives 
unless the medical or other officer of the Underwriters . . . 
shall be allowed . . . in the event of death to make any post-
mortem examination of the body of the Assured as the Under-
writers are advised necessary for the purpose of ascertaining 
the . . . true cause of death. . . . '' 
The beneficiaries attack the judgment against them upon 
the ground that the trial judge rlid not properly instruct the 
jury. The insurer's position is that the rulings upon instruc-
tions were correct. 
Complaint is made of an instruction given at the request 
of the insurer by which the jury was told that the plaintiffs 
had the burden of proving that the death of Francis was 
not ''directly or indirectly caused or contributed to by ... 
disease or natural causes.' '1 The effect of this instruction, 
they assert, is to deprive them of the benefit of the rule 
established by Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 
2d 305 [163 P.2d 689], and particularly as that rule was 
applied in Happoldt v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 90 Cal.App.2d 
386 [203 P.2d 55]. 
The Brooks case was an action upon a policy insuring 
against "the results of bodily injuries ... caused directly 
1
'' Plaintiffs have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the death of George H. Francis was not directly or in-
directly caused or contributed to by intentional self-injury, disease or 
natural causes. Furthermore plaintiffs may not recover if the evidence 
affirmatively shows that intentional self-injury, disease or natural causes 
caused or contributed to the death of the insured directly or indirectly. 
In determining what is meant by the language 'caused or contributed to' 
and 'directly or indirectly' you will consider all of the instructions and 
as a whole.'' 
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and independently of all other causes by violent and acci-
dental means.'' The insurer agreed to pay double indemnity 
if the injuries were received ''in consequence of the burning 
of any building in which the insured shall be at the com-
mencement of the fire.'' The policy further provided: ''This 
insurance shall not cover suicide or any attempt thereat while 
sane or insane; ... nor shall it cover accident, injury, dis-
ability, death or any other loss caused wholly or partly, di-
rectly or indirectly, by disease or mental infirmity or medical 
or surgical treatment therefor.'' The insured, who was chron-
ically ill, died in a fire which started in his bedroom. It 
was the autopsy surgeon's opinion that death was caused by 
second and third degree burns. After a verdict in favor. 
of the insurer, a motion for a new trial was granted upon 
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. In affirming the 
order granting a new trial, the court said "that the presence 
of preexisting disease or infirmity will not relieve the insurer 
from liability if the accident is the proximate cause of death; 
and that recovery may be had even though a diseased or 
infirm condition appears to actually contribute to cause the 
death if the accident sets in progress the chain of events 
leading directly to death, or if it is the prime or moving 
cause.'' (Pp. 309-310.) Otherwise stated, the insurer is 
liable although death is caused partly by a preexisting disease 
or infirmity and partly by an accident, if the accident is 
the prime or moving cause. (Happoldt v. Guardian Life 
Ins. Co., supra, at p. 399.) 
The provisions of the policies here sued upon are substan-
tially the same as those considered in the Brooks case. The 
appellants assert that the language ''directly or indirectly 
caused or contributed to" is too broad and improperly states 
the rule as to proximate cause. That phraseology, Under-
writers rf)ply, should not be construed in isolation. The defect, 
if any, says the insurer, is cured by the concluding sentence 
directing the jurors to consider the instructions as a whole. 
[1] The first two sentences of the instruction unduly stress 
the significance of any contribution to the death of Francis 
by preexisting disease or intentional self-injury. To that 
extent the instruction is inconsistent with the rule on causa-
tion as laid down in the Brooks case, and as stated to the 
jurors in several other instructions. 
In the last sentence of the instruction, the jurors were 
told that they were to determine the meaning of ''caused 
or contributed to" and "directly or indirectly" from "all of 
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the instructions and as a whole.'' In other instru.ctions, they 
were told explicitly that "recovery may be had even though 
a diseased or infirm condition appears to actually contribute 
to the cause of death, if the happening, within the coverage 
of the insurance, sets in progress the chain of events leading 
directly to death, or if it is the prime or moving cause.' '2 
By these instructions, which exactly declared the rule of 
the Brooks case, the jurors were informed of the technical 
legal meaning of the words used in the policy which state 
the conditions of the insurer's liability. It must be assumed 
that the jurors followed the court's direction and applied the 
law properly. 
'' 
2If, under the insurance eertificates here involved, the assured sus-
tained any accidental bodily injury caused by an accident or suffered ex-
uosure or physical exhaustion covered by the certificates as heretofore 
defined which bodily injury or exposure or physical exhaustion proxi-
mately caused to be set in progress disease, infection or other conditions 
which in natural and continuous sequence operated directly to cause death 
of the assured, then that death is considered in law to have resulted from 
said bodily injury as the bodily injury in such a situation is considered to 
be the proximate cause of the death. Bodily injury, you will recall, 
includes, under the definition of the certificates, the exposure or physical 
exhaustion covered by the certificates." (Plaintiffs' instruction No. 36.) 
''The presence of pre-existing disease does not relieve the insurer from 
liability if an accident exposure or exhaustion as heretofore defined is 
the proximate, prime or moving cause of the insured's death, or if it 
sets in progress a chain of events leading directly to the death .... '' 
(Defendant's instruction No. 20.) 
"You are instructed that, if a happening occurs which is within the 
coverage provisions of a policy such as those here involved and if that 
happening proximately caused a diseased condition or infirmity which 
results in death of the insured, then such happening may be the proxi-
mate cause of said death." (Plaintiffs' instruction No. 35.) 
''If you find that a happening occurred which is within the coverage 
of the policy and that it, operating upon an unhealthy body, caused and 
put in motion a chain of events which is traced to said happening, then 
the happening may be the proximate cause of death. In other words, a 
recovery may be had even though a diseased or infirm condition appears 
to actually contribute to the cause of death, if the happening, within the 
coverage of the insurance, sets in progress the chain of events leading 
directly to death, or if it is the prime or moving cause.'' (Plaintiffs' 
instruction No. 14.) 
"If you find that George I-T. Francis sustained any accidental bodily 
injury caused by an accident or if you find that he suffered exposure to 
the elements resulting from an accident or exposure to the elements 
resulting from mechanical or other failnre of anything used as a means 
of conYeyance or transportation or if you find that he suffered physical 
exhaustion resulting from an accident or mechanical or other failure of 
anything used as a moans of conYeyance or transportation, and if you 
further find that such bodily injury or such exposure to the elements or 
such physical exhaustion proximately caused some bodily infirmity or 
inflammatory process or infection or ailment from which de:1th resulted, 
then you are instructed that sueh denth did not result directly or in-
directly from disease or natural cause." (Plaintiffs' instruction No. 15.) 
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In this connection it is important to note that the evi-
dence presented by Underwriters was not offered in sup-
port of the theory that the death of Francis was occasioned 
in part by accident and in part by a preexisting disease or 
intentional self-injury. The insurer argued to the jury that 
death was due to ''an overindulgence in alcohol, combined 
with a small ingestion or taking of barbiturates, added on 
to a preexisting heart condition.'' On the other hand, the 
beneficiaries relied upon bronchopneumonia as being the sole 
cause of death. In these circumstances it cannot reasonably 
be concluded that the jury could have misinterpreted the 
language of the instruction here attacked. 
[2] The second instruction complained of also was given 
at the insurer's request. It reads: "The burden of proof is 
upon plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance of .the evidence 
that the death of Mr. Francis was occasioned by accidental 
bodily injury caused by accident or by exposure to the ele-
ments or physical exhaustion resulting from an accident or 
mechanical or other failure of anything used as a means of 
conveyance or transportation, and that such was the cause 
of his death solely and independently of any other cause.'' 
Exception is taken to ''solely and independently of any other 
cause.'' The quoted language is said to be similar to and 
to have the same effect as that in the instruction condemned 
in Happoldt v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., supra, at pp. 398-399. 
However, the beneficiaries are in no position to criticize the 
instruction presented by Underwriters because the jury was 
given a substantially similar instruction requested by them.3 
It is well established that a party cannot complain of 
an error in an instruction given at the request of his ad-
versary when one requested by him also contains the same 
error. (Wells v. Lloyd, 21 Cal.2d 452, 460 [132 P.2d 471] ; 
Yolo Water &; Power Co. v. Hudson, 182 Cal. 48, 51 [186 
P. 772] .) 
[3a] Another instruction, given at the request of Under-
writers, reads: ''I have instructed you that the proximate 
cause of death is that cause which, in natural and continuous 
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, pro-
duces the death, and without which· the result would not have 
occurred. If, therefore, you find that the death of Mr. Francis 
3
'' You are instructed that, while it is plaintiffs' burden of proof to 
show that, solely and independently of any other cause, there was oc-
casioned to the Assured accidental death caused by accident .... '' 
(Plaintiffs' instruction No. 38.) 
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would have occurred in any event at or about the time it 
did occur, as a result of intentional self-injury, disease or 
natural causes from which he was suffering continuously be-
fore and after the alleged accident, then and in those events 
your verdict must be in favor of the defendant.'' 
The beneficiaries argue that this instruction is practically 
the same as one in the Happoldt case which was held to be 
erroneous. There, however, the instruction was one of three 
which were condemned as a group in that they were more 
favorable to the insurer than they should have been. The 
court concluded that the erroneous group of instructions 
''directed the jury to the effect that there could be no recovery 
if the death was caused partly by disease and partly by acci-
dental injury." (P. 399.) Here, read with the other in-
structions, the challenged one is a proper statement of the 
principle enunciated in the Brooks case. It merely conversely 
declares the rule which requires the beneficiaries to prove 
that an accident was the prime or moving cause of death. 
If in a given case death would have occurred in any event 
from some other cause at or about the time it did occur, 
clearly that accident was not the prime or moving cause of 
death. 
Complaint is also made of the refusal to give one of the 
beneficiaries' requested instructions.4 However, it merely 
restated the rule of the Brooks case in slightly different 
language. [4] Instructions which are cumulative or merely 
amplifications of other instructions, need not be given. (Hicks 
v. Ocean Shore Railroad, Inc., 18 Cal.2d 773, 783 [117 P.2d 
850] ; Estate of Clark, 180 Cal. 395, 399 [181 P. 639] .) 
On the question of burden of proof, the beneficiaries main-
tain that the insurer was required to prove that death resulted 
from intentional self-injury or disease, inasmuch as they are 
causes of death excluded by the policies.5 The position of 
4
" Death of George H. Francis did not result directly or indirectly from 
disease or natural cause, so as to bar recovery under either policy, if 
his death was the proximate result of any one or combination of the 
events, covered by said policies and herein summarized, which event or 
combination aggravated or awakened a previously existing bodily in-
firmity or dormant ailment from which death resulted.'' (Plaintiffs' 
requested instruction No. 13.) 
"Plaintiffs' requested instructions on this point are as follows: "Each 
policy contains what are commonly referred to as exclusionary clauses 
or exclusions from coverage. Only certain of these are relied upon by 
defendant as excluding coverage otherwise provided for by said policies. 
'L'hose so relied upon will be noted in these instructions. One of the 
exclusions provided for in said policies is: 'Death directly or indirectly 
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the insurer was stated to the jury by its instructions placing 
the burden upon the beneficiaries to establish (1) that death 
resulted from an accidental bodily injury as defined by the 
policies, and caused by accident; and (2) that death was not 
caused" by intentional self-injury, disease or natural causes. " 6 
The burden of proof was upon the beneficiaries, they con-
cede, to establish that the death of Francis occurred as a 
result of a "bodily injury" within the meaning of that term 
as defined by the policy. (Postler v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 
Cal. 1, 3 [158 P. 1022] ; Kellner v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 180 
Cal. 326, 330 [181 P. 61]; Ogilvie v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 
189 Cal. 406, 413 [209 P. 26, 26 A.L.R. 116] ; Travelers' Ins. 
Co. v. Wilkes, 76 F.2d 701, 705.) [5] Ordinarily the bur-
den is upon the insurer to prove a true excepted cause or 
excluded risk in order to defeat liability upon that ground. 
(Mattson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 100 Cal.App. 96, 98 
[279 P. 1045]; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Wilkes, supra, p. 705.) 
The question for decision, therefore, is whether, under the 
caused or contributed to by disease or natural causes.' As to chis ex-
clusion, you are instructed as follows:" (Plaintiffs' requested, instruc-
tion No. 12.) "Death of George H. Francis did not result directly or 
indirectly from disease or natural cause, so as to bar recovery under 
either policy, if his death was the proximate result of any one or com-
bination of the events, covered by said policies and herein summarized, 
which event or combination aggravated or awakened a previously existing 
bodily infirmity or dormant ailment from which death resulted.'' 
(Plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 13.) "Another exclusion provided 
for in said policies is: 'Death directly or indirectly caused or con-
tributed to by intentional self-injury.' As to this exclusionary provision 
you are instructed as follows:" (Plaintiffs' conditionally requested in-
struction No. 16.) "In order to sustain this defense, the burden rests 
upon defendant Underwriters to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, each required element thereof. Under this exclusionary provision, 
it is not sufficient to prove merely that there was a self-injury, if any. 
The proof must further establish by a preponderance that the self-
injury, if any, was intentional on the part of the insured and also that 
it either directly or indirectly caused or contributed to the death of the 
insured. If the evidence fails to establish each of these required ele-
ments by a preponderance, then this exclusionary provision has not been 
proven but must be determined against defendant and in favor of 
plaintiffs." (Plaintiffs' conditionally requested instruction No. 17.) 
6In its entirety, as modified by the trial court, the second instruction 
states: "Plaintiffs have the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the death of George H. Francis was not directly or 
indirectly caused or contributed to by intentional self-injury, disease 
or natural causes. Furthermore plaintiffs may not reeover if the evi-
dence affirmatively shows that intentional self-injury, disease or natural 
causes caused or contributed to the death of the insured directly or in-
directly. In determining what is meant by the language 'caused or 
contributed to' and 'directly or indirectly' you will consider all of the 
instructions and as a whole. '' 
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present policies, death occasioned by either intentional self-
injury or disease, is death by reason of an excepted cause. 
The policies here insured against ''accidental bodily injury 
[including 'bodily injury which shall occasion death' as de-
fined in the policies] caused by accident.'' ''Accident'' has 
been defined as ''a casualty-something out of the usual 
course of events and which happens suddenly and unex-
pectedly and without any design of the person injured.'' 
(Rock v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 172 Cal. 462, 465 [156 P. 1029, 
L.R.A. 1916E 1196] ; Richards v. Travelers Ins. Co., 89 Cal. 
170, 175 [26 P. 762, 23 Am.St.Rep. 455] .) Basically, these 
policies are contracts insuring against accident, and it need 
not be here determined whether they can be characterized 
as insuring against "accidental death" or only against "death 
effected by accidental means." (Roclc v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 
supra, p. 465; and see Unt:ted States Mut. Ace. Assn. v. 
Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 121 [9 S.Ct. 755, 33 L.Ed. 60] ; Lincoln 
Nat. L'ife Ins. Co. v. Erickson [O.C.A. 8th], 42 F.2d 997, 1000.) 
The beneficiaries contend that Clause E-2 of the policy 
enlarged the coverage as stated in other provisions of the 
contract. However, unquestionably the only purpose of that 
clause is to define the term ''any accidental bodily injury 
caused by accident'' to include ''death by exposure to the 
elements or physical exhaustion ... resulting from an acci-
dent or other failure or anything used as a means of convey-
ance or transportation." And the law governing the insurer's 
liability was correctly stated to the jury. 
[6] With regard to "intentional self-injury," the jury 
was properly instructed as to burden of proof. It is the 
antonym of ''accidental,'' and therefore expresses a concept 
which manifestly is the antithesis of a death occasioned by 
accident. [7] Death by suicide reasonably may be said 
to have been caused by "intentional self-injury" (Barber v. 
Industrial Corn., 241 Wis. 462, 464-465 [6 N.W.2d 199, 143 
A.L.R. 1222]), and in an action upon an accident policy 
which excluded liability for death by suicide, the court pointed 
out that the contract did not provide for payment for death 
but for death by accident. ''Suicide, at least when sane, is 
not accidental death. A plaintiff under this policy has the 
burden of proving an accidental death, thereby negativing 
suicide." (Travelers' lns. Oo. v. W'ilkes, supra, p. 705; see 
also New York L'ife Ins. Co. v. Garner, 303 U.S. 161, 171 
[58 S.Ct. 500, 82 L.Ed. 726, 114 A.L.R. 1218]; Griffin v. 
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Prudential Ins. Co., 102 Utah 563, 586 [133 P.2d 333, 114 
A.L.R. 1402] .) [8] By analogy, then, in a suit upon an 
accident policy, the beneficiary's proof of accident proximately 
causing death necessarily negatives "intentional self-injury." 
[9] Upon that construction of the insuring provisions, 
Dennis v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 84 Cal. 570 [24 P. 120], 
and Bebbington v. California Western States Life Ins. Co., 30 
Cal.2d 157 [180 P.2d 673, 1 A.L.R.2d 361], are distinguish-
able. The Dennis case was an action to recover upon the 
usual life insurance policy containing an exception to lia-
bility if death resulted from suicide. Reasoning that the 
exception was a true condition subsequent, the court placed 
upon the insurer the burden of proving suicide as the proxi-
mate cause of death. Mrs. Bebbington sued upon a life in-
surance policy with a clause excluding liability in the event 
the death of the insured occurred as a result of airplane 
travel other than as a fare-paying passenger in a licensed 
aircraft flying a regularly scheduled passenger flight. Under 
such circumstances, the liability of the insurer was limited 
to the reserve of the policy. Neither of those decisions states 
the proper rule applicable to an accident insurance policy. 
Other cases relied upon by the beneficiaries are also dis-
tinguishable. Postler v. Travele1·s' Ins. Co., supra, was an 
action upon policies insuring ''against bodily injuries effected 
directly and independently of all other causes through ex-
ternal, violent, and accidental means (suicide, whether sane 
or insane, is not covered)." It was held, without discussion, 
and citing Dennis v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, that 
'' [ o] n the issue of suicide the burden of proof rested upon 
the defendant.'' However, the court failed to note that the 
Dennis case was an action upon a life insurance policy, and 
the rule of law there stated and followed is inapplicable to 
accident insurance. The burden of establishing suicide, there-
fore, should not have been put upon the insurer, as the provi-
sion as to death from that cause was not a condition subse-
quent, but merely definitive of the precise risk assumed. 
Mah See v. North American Ace. Ins. Co., 190 Cal. 421 
[213 P. 42, 26 A.L.R. 123], also was an action upon a life 
insurance policy and did not distinguish correctly between 
different forms of insurance. Insofar as these decisions are 
inconsistent with the rule here stated upon the issue of burden 
of proof, they are overruled. For the same reason, and to 
the same extent, Hmtsh v. Pacific States Life Ins. Co., 2 Cal. 
App.2d 14 [37 P.2d 741], is disapproved. 
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(10] A rule as to whether or not death caused by disease 
constitutes a true excepted risk cannot be given in general 
terms or by way or broad principles of law. As a gen-
eral proposition, however, "The insurer, under an accident 
policy, is not liable for death by mere disease, even in the 
absence of the usual clause expressly excluding disease from 
among the risks assumed.'' (Vance on Insurance [2d ed. 
1930], § 259, p. 880.) The rule is clear but varying definitions 
of "disease" make it difficult to apply. 
A medical definition of ''disease'' is : ''In general, any 
departure from a state of health ; an illness or a disease. 
More specifically a definite morbid process having a charac-
teristic tr.ain of symptoms. It may affect the whole body 
or any of its parts, and its etiology, pathology, and prognosis 
may be known or unknown.'' (The American Illustrated 
Medical Dictionary [Dorland], 17th ed. 1937.) In Dickerson 
v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 56 Ariz. 70 [105 P.2d 517], 
the court relied principally upon the statement in Webster's 
Dictionary. In the course of considering an accident policy 
containing provisions similar to the present ones, "disease" 
was defined as a condition in which bodily health is seriously 
attacked, deranged, or impaired, and as an alteration of state 
of the human body or some of its organs or parts, interrupting 
or disturbing the performance of the vital functions. 
In Matter of Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co., 240 N.Y. 83 
[147 N.E. 366], Judge Cardozo succinctly pointed out the 
elusive character of ''disease'' as it relates to workmen's 
compensation statutes. He said: "We attempt no scientifi-
cally exact discrimination between accident and disease or 
between disease and injury. None perhaps is possible, for 
the two concepts are not always exclusive, the one of the 
other, but often overlap." ( P. 84.) 
[11] Here, the sole theory of the beneficiaries is that there 
is liability under the language of Clause E-2 of the policies. 
The insurer has not urged that the beneficiaries' theory, 
assuming it to be factually true, was not within the scope 
and intent of the clause. Nor do the beneficiaries assert that 
the evidence offered by Underwriters which tended to show 
that Francis was suffering from certain organic conditions, 
did not constitute "disease." In these circumstances, the 
jury having been instructed upon burden of proof in very 
general terms only, without attempting to define disease, there 
was no error. 
For these reasons, under the policies here sued upon, 
476 ZncKEitMAN v. UKDI~RWRITEHS AT Lr,oYn's [ 42 C.2d 
death occasioned by intentional self-injury or disease is not 
one which occurs by reason of excepted causes. The "exclu-
elause'' is the antithesis of the ''insuring clause.'' 
If ]'rands died as the result of an accident, death was not 
occasioned by intentional self-injury, disease or natural 
causes. Conversely, if intentional self-injury, disease or 
natural causes caused his death, it did not result from an 
accident within the meaning of the policy. The instructions 
to the jury in regard to the burden of proof on these issues 
were correct. 
It is not significant that Underwriters pleaded as affirma-
tive defenses that the death of Francis occurred as a result 
of either intentional self-injury or disease and natural causes. 
[12] A denial that death was occasioned by a bodily injury 
within the meaning of the policy is a sufficient plea. An 
additional defense that it was the result of intentional self-
injury or disease does not shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant. (Kellner v. Travelers' Ins. Co., supra, p. 330; 
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, supra, p. 171; Travelers' 
Ins. Co. v. Wilkes, supra, p. 705; Whitlatch v. Fidelity & 
Casualty Co., 149 N.Y. 45, 48 [43 N.E. 405].) 
[3b] The beneficiaries challenge an instruction which 
reads, in part: ''If, therefore, you find that the death of 
Mr. Francis would have occurred in any event at or about 
the time it did occur, as a result of intentional self-injury, 
disease or natural causes from which he was suffering con-
tinuously before and after the alleged accident, then and 
in those events your verdict must be in favor of the de-
fendant.'' It is urged that this instruction, requested by 
Underwriters, erroneously assumed as an established fact 
that Francis continuously before and after the accident was 
suffering from some self-injury, disease or natural condition, 
whereas the evidence thereon was either otherwise or directly 
conflicting. The criticism ignores the prefatory language, 
''If, therefore, you find,'' and the concluding qualification, 
"then and in those events." (See Happoldt v. Gttardian Life 
Ins. Co., sttpra, pp. 397-398.) 
[13] Complaint is made of the court's refusal to instruct 
upon the difference between ''accidental death'' and ''death 
by accidental means." It is argued that the policies covered 
''accidental death,'' which is a less limited concept, and thus 
afforded greater coverage than ''death by accidental means.'' 
In a proper case that distinction should be made. (Ogilvie 
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra, p. 411; Rock v. Travelers' Ins. 
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Go., sttpra, p. 465; 111uh&al Ace. Assn. v. Barry, supra, p. 121; 
Lincoln Nat. L1:[e Ins. Go. v. Erickson, sttpra, p. 1000.) Here, 
however, the policies do not use either term, and their pro-
visions, including Clause E-2 were before the jury. Nothing 
more was required. 
[14] The beneficiaries also insist that the jury should 
have been instructed as to the meaning of "bodily injury." 
It is their position that to leave the term undefined allows 
the jury to surmise or speculate or determine that it could 
not include a death where no external injury was had. How-
ever, "bodily injury" was defined for the jurors by stating 
the express language of the policies, and they were told: 
'' 'Bodily injury which shall occasion death' includes, in 
addition to the coverage herein provided, death by exposure 
to the elements or physical exhaustion or drowning resulting 
from an accident or mechanical or other failure of anything 
used as a means of conveyance or transportation." No 
prejudice resulted from the refusal to instruct as to other 
meanings of the insuring phrase. 
The instruction to the effect that immediate notice of death 
was required to be given Underwriters is also attacked by 
the beneficiaries. They claim that there has not been full 
compliance with section 551 of the Insurance Code. That 
statute provides: "Except in the case of life, marine, or 
fire insurance, notice of an accident, injury or death may 
be given at any time within twenty days after the event, 
to the insurer under a policy against loss therefrom. In 
such a policy, no requirement of notice within a lesser period 
shall be valid." It is asserted that this is not a case involving 
"life, marine or fire insurance," and inasmuch as it has been 
stipulated that notice was given within the 20-day limit, 
Underwriters cannot rely upon the provision of the policies. 
In the alternative, the beneficiaries take the position that 
section 10335 of the Insurance Code governs the time of notice 
of claim. That section permits the inclusion of "immediate 
notice in case of accidental death'' only in the event the 
statutory ''standard provision relative to time of notice of 
claim" also is used. The beneficiaries assert that even if 
it is assumed that the language in the policy need not be 
identical with that of the statute, the policies on the life of 
Francis do not substantially comply with the legislative re-
quirement. They invoke the rule that whel'e a prescribed 
statutory provision is not contained in the policy, the insurer 
will be bound either by the statutory provision or by the 
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policy provision, whichever is more favorable to the benefi-
ciary. It is contended, also, that Underwriters has waived 
notice of claim in that objection was not made promptly and 
specifically upon that ground, as required by section 554 
of the Insurance Code. Furthermore, it is argued, in the 
event that the question of notice properly was left to the 
jury's determination, the instructions did not adequately 
state as to when notice has been given "immediately." 
As for the last point, the jury was told: ''A provision that 
immediate notice be given is satisfied by notice which is 
prompt and reasonable under the particular circumstances. 
A failure to give immediate notice is no defense where it 
was not reasonably possible to give such notice and the notice 
actually was given as soon as reasonably possible.'' And 
again, ''Thus the plaintiffs have the burden of proving that 
notice was given to the Underwriters within a reasonable 
time according to the circumstances existing in this case.'' 
It is not necessary to pass upon the other contentions 
pertaining to. notice. [15a] Even if it be assumed that the 
issue of notice should not have been left to the jury's deter-
mination, there has not been a miscarriage of justice within 
the meaning of the constitutional provision. (Cal. Const., 
art. VI, § 4%.) 
On this issue the beneficiaries were treated separately. The 
jury was instructed: "Plaintiffs Zuckerman and Edmunds 
as members of the partnership are presumed to have had 
knowledge of the terms and conditions of the certificates at 
all times after the certificates were issued and at the time of 
the death of deceased. They were required to notify defendant 
immediately as soon as they learned of the death. It is for 
you to determine when they or either of them or anyone 
acting in their behalf and with their knowledge learned of 
the death, and it is for you to determine further whether 
they notified defendant immediately of the death. As to the 
plaintiff James Francis it is for you to determine (1) when 
he learned of the existence of the certificate naming him as 
beneficiary in the event of the death of his brother and its 
requirement of immediate notice to defendant, (2) when he 
learned of the death and (3) whether, as soon as he had 
knowledge of the requirement of immediate notice and also 
had knowledge of the death of deceased he gave such imme-
diate notice to .defendant by such means and in such a manner 
as was reasonable and proper under all the circumstances.'' 
[16] It must be assumed that the jury understood the 
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instructions and correctly applied them to the evidence. 
(Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel, 36 Cal.2d 493, 500 [225 P.2d 
497] ; Henderson v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 150 Cal. 689, 
697 [89 P. 976] .) [15b] James did not know that he was 
a named beneficiary in one of the policies until approximately 
the time when notice was given, March 29th. The notice 
dated March 29th was given on behalf of the law partnership 
and James. Under those circumstances, there can be little 
doubt that the jury found that James gave "immediate no-
tice." The jury, however, found against him as well as 
against the law partnership. James, therefore, could not 
have been prejudiced by permitting the issue of notice to go 
to the jury. 
Nor can it be argued that the law partnership, never-
theless, was prejudiced in that regard. On only one other 
issue, the question pertaining to Underwriters' right to 
autopsy, were the plaintiffs treated separately. Unless the 
jury reasonably might have found that James did not dis-
charge his duties as to that condition, then neither he· nor 
the partnership could possibly have been prejudiced by the 
submission of the issue of notice to the jury. Unless the 
jury decided against James on either the issue of notice or 
that of autopsy rights, the case necessarily must have 
been decided upon another ground. The remaining ground 
concerns the cause of death as defined by the policies. That 
is one which is common to the claims of all of the beneficiaries. 
The beneficiaries also contend that the issue of autopsy 
rights should not have been submitted to the jury for deter-
mination. That position is based upon their interpretation 
of that part of Clause G-2 of the policies which provides: 
''In no case will the Underwriters be liable to make compen-
sation to the Assured or to his represr.ntatives . . . unless 
. . . Underwriters . . . shall be allowed . . . in the event of 
death to make any post-mortem examination of the body of 
the Assured as [is] necessary .... " It is argued that 
''beneficiaries'' are not ''representatives'' of the assured; 
also, that the language of an insurance policy is to be con-
strued most strongly against the insurer, particularly where 
a forfeiture provision is involved. Another point is that Un-
derwriters waived the right to autopsy in that it did not make 
a prompt request. It is quite improbable that the jury found 
against James Francis on the ground of noncompliance witlt 
the autopsy provision. One instruction read: "Plaintiff 
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,James Francis as a brother of deceased could have consented 
to such a post mortem by defendant. Neither James Francis 
nor the other beneficiaries in this case, however, could by 
his own order have prevented the cremation of the body of 
deceased if such cremation had been ordered by some person 
legally authorized so to do. \Vhen a beneficiary knew of the 
terms of the certificates and learned of the death of deceased 
it was his duty to do such things as were reasonable and 
proper under all the circumstances to afford defendant the 
opportunity to make its own post mortem examination.'' 
[17] The uncontradicted testimony of James Francis con-
clusively proves, for the purpose of determining whether or 
not asserted error was prejudicial, that he did not order 
cremation of the body. He did not know that he was a 
beneficiary under one of the policies until at least one week 
after the cremation. Under these circumstances, he was 
not prejudiced by the submission of that issue to the jury. 
Also, as the jury most probably did not find against 
JamBs Francis on the issue of notice, the implied finding of 
the jury is that the death of the insured did not result from 
a "bodily injury" within the meaning of the policies. That 
implied finding effectively prevents the law partners of 
Francis from claiming prejudicial error as to them in per-
mitting the questions of notice and autopsy rights to go to 
the jury. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I agree with the beneficiaries that Brooks v. Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal.2d 305 [163 P.2d 689], decided by a 
unanimous court, is controlling here. The attempt on the 
part of the majority of this court to distinguish it without 
overruling it, in my opinion, but serves to point out the 
correctness of that decision as applied to the facts presented 
here. We said there that " [on] the other hand there !s 
authority for what in our opinion is the correct rule, that 
the presence of preexisting disease or infirmity will not re-
lieve the insurer from liability if the accident is the proximate 
cause of death; and that recovery may be had even though 
a diseased or infirm condition appears to actually contribute 
to cause the death if the accident sets in progress the chain 
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of events leading directly to death, or if it is the prime or 
moving cause. (Scanlan v. Ins. Co., 
(C.C.A. 7th, 1937), 93 F.2d v. Pntdential 
Ins. Co. of Ame1·ica (1939), 834 [6 A.2d 55, 59]; 
1 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice (1941), pp. 497, 498; 
6 Couch on Insurance (1930), § 1249, p. 4569 cf. Hanna v. 
Interstate B. JJI. Ace. Assn., 41 Cal.App. 308, 310 [182 P. 
771] .) " It was also said there that "[a]lthough it appears 
that the insured was suffering from an incurable cancer and 
was under the influence of narcotics given to relieve pain, and 
that by reason of his weakened and infirm condition he may 
have been less able than a normal person to withstand the 
effect of the injuries, there is evidence from which the court 
could conclude that the proximate cause of his death was 
burns received in a fire of accidental origin.'' 
An analysis of the facts involved here in the light of the 
rule of the Brooks case shows that the policy provided, under 
the heading ''DEFINITIONS,'' that it was understood and 
agreed that "bodily injury which shall occasion death" in-
cluded, "in addition to the coverage herein provided, death 
by exposure to the elements or physical exhaustion or drown-
ing resulting from an accident or mechanical or other failure 
of anything used as a means of conveyance or transportation.'' 
(Emphasis added.) Here, the insured suffered from exposure 
to the elements by reason of the failure of his boat to return 
to the mainland. The following statement from the majority 
opinion relative to the medical testimony in this case shows 
that it was based on the worst kind of hearsay evidence : 
"Dr. Baird testified that he put 'acute alcoholism' on the 
death certificate because au acquaintance of the deceased in-
formed him that Francis was an alcoholic drinker. Accord-
ing to Dr. Baird, his diagnosis of edema of the brain was 
based solely on the statement made to him that Francis used 
intoxicants. Edema of the brain, said Dr. Baird, results 
either from alcohol or injury 'and in this case there was no 
evidence of injur·y.' His examination was made by 'gross' 
methods, that is, what he could see with his eyes and feel 
with his hands, in contradistinction to microscopic study.'' 
It should be noted that under the provisions of the policy 
there needed to be no evidence of injury as such. There 
would be no evidence of injury so far as physical exhaustion 
was concerned, or in all probability so far as exposure to 
the elements was concerned. The beneficiaries established the 
42 C.2d-16 
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facts concerning the ill-fated fishing trip. In all other re-
spects the evidence was highly conflicting. Some witnesses 
testified that the insured was a heavy drinker; others that 
he never drank to excess; still others testified that he rarely 
drank. The evidence was also in direct conflict as to whether 
the insured had been ill prior to the fishing trip. The medical 
testimony was uncertain and conflicting and was, for the 
most part, based upon insufficient evidence and hearsay. An 
example is the medical evidence relating to the cause of death: 
the expert for the beneficiaries testified that the insured died 
of bronchial pneumonia; the expert for the insurer testified 
that he ''didn't believe'' the insured died of pneumonia, and 
that it was his opinion that the primary cause of death was 
a ''condition which led to circulatory collapse and edema 
and congestion of the lung" which occurred "primarily" in 
acute heart failure. Other evidence showed that an electro-
cardiagram made for the insured two years before his death 
established that Francis had a normal heart for a man of 
his age. 
The evidence showed that the insured, after suffering the 
mishap, had chills, complained of not feeling well to the 
extent of contacting his doctor, taking the prescribed drugs, 
and making plans to go to the desert to recuperate. There 
is nothing to show that any previous physical condition 
substantially or materially contributed to the death of the 
insured. The majority admits that the policy sued on here 
is substantially the same as in the Brooks case and that 
the insurer may be held liable although death is caused partly 
by a preexisting disease or infirmity and partly by accident 
so long as the accident is the prime or moving cause. In 
view of the rule of the Brooks case and the facts presented 
here, one of the instructions complained of was a misstatement 
of the law and highly prejudicial to the beneficiaries. That 
instruction told the jury, "Furthermore plaintiffs may not 
recover if the evidence affirmatively shows that intentional 
self-injury, disease or natural causes caused or contributed 
to the death of the insured directly or indirectly." In the 
majority opinion it is said, ''The first two sentences of the 
instruction unduly stress the significance of any contribution 
to the death of Francis by pre-existing disease or intentional 
self-injury. To that extent the instruction is inconsistent 
with the rule on causation as laid down in the Brooks case, 
and as stated to the jurors in several other instructions.'' 
(Emphasis added.) As I have heretofore pointed out, the 
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Brooks case qualifies the provision by holding that the insurer 
is not relieved from liability if a preexisting disease or in-
firmity ''appears to actually contribute to cause the death if 
the accident sets in progress the chain of events leading di-
rectly to death, or if it is the prime or moving cause.'' 
(Emphasis added.) The majority explain away the incon-
sistencies by the argument that other instructions followed 
the rule of the Brooks case. For every instruction stating 
the rule of the Brooks case, there is another instruction which 
is inconsistent with it. For example, the jury was directed 
to deny recovery if the death was caused partially by disease 
and partially by accident. Still another instruction informed 
the jury that plaintiffs must prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the insured met his death by accident or 
exposure and that the death occurred "solely and independ-
ently" (italics added) of any other cause. 
The most flagrantly prejudicial, and erroneous, instruction 
was that which placed upon the beneficiaries the burden of 
proving that the insured's death was not caused by intentional 
self-injury, disease or natural causes. The majority concedes 
that ''ordinarily the burden is upon the insurer to prove a 
true excepted cause or excluded risk in order to defeat 
liability upon that ground.'' In order to avoid the effect of 
this concession, it is held that these exceptions were not 
exceptions at all. The insurer pleaded, in its answer, as 
separate and affirmative defenses, that death was caused by 
disease or by natural causes; as an amendment to the answer, 
another affirmative defense was added-that death was caused 
by intentional self-injury. It had been held prior to the 
Brooks case that the absence of disease was a part of the 
plaintiff's case; and, prior to the present case, it had also 
been held that death by intentional self-injury, or suicide, 
was part of the insurer's case and that the burden of proof 
was upon the insurer. In order to hold that the burden of 
proving that the death was not caused by intentional self-
injury was on the plaintiffs the majority says " [b] y analogy 
then, in a suit upon an accident policy, by proof of accident 
proximately causing death, the beneficiary necessarily nega-
tives 'intentional self-injury'" and relies upon Barber v. 
lnd1£strial Com., 241 Wis. 462, 464-465 [6 N.W.2d 199, 143 
A.L.R. 1222], Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Wilkes, 76 F.2d 701, 
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161 [58 S.Ct. 
500, 82 L.Ed. 726, 114 A.L.R. 1218], Griffin v. Prudential 
Ins. Co., 102 Utah 563 [133 P.2d 333, 144 A.L.R. 1402]. 
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The majority say '' [I] t is not significant that Underwriters 
pleaded as affirmative defenses that the death of Francis 
occurred as a result of either intentional self-injury or disease 
and natural causes. A denial that death was occasioned by 
a bodily injury within the meaning· of the policy is a sufficient 
plea. An additional defense that it was the result of inten-
tional self-injury or disease does not shift the burden of 
proof to the defendant. [Citations.] " All of this rests 
upon the reasoning that intentional self-injury is the antonym 
of accidental and therefore expresses a concept which mani-
festly is the antithesis of a death occasioned by accident. 
''The rule supported by the overwhelming weight of authority, 
in cases involving accident policies or other policies with acci-
dent features containing express conditions or exceptions 
excluding or limiting the coverage of the policy as to an 
injury or death which would otherwise be within such cov-
er·age, is that the burden of proving that the insured's injury 
or death was within such conditions or exceptions is on the 
insurer, and that the plaintiff is not under any burden of 
negativing application of such exception or conditions.'' 
(Emphasis added; 142 A.L.R. 746.) Where the instructions 
erroneously place the burden of proof upon the wrong party, 
the error is prejudicial (Anderson v. Mothershead, 19 Cal. 
App.2d 97 [64 P.2d 995]; Westberg v. Willde, 14 Cal.2d 360 
[94 P.2d 590]; Howard v. Worthington, 50 Cal.App. 556 [195 
P. 709] ; FergtlSOn v. Nakahara, 43 Cal.App.2d 435 [110 
P.2d 1091] ; Ross v. Baldwin, 44 Cal.App.2d 433 [112 P.2d 
666] ; Scott v. Renz, 67 Cal.App.2d 428 [154 P.2d 7381). 
Two California cases (Dennis v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
84 Cal. 570 [24 P. 120], and Bebbington v. California West-
ern States Life Ins. Co., 30 Cal.2d 157 [180 P.2d 673, 1 
A.J_;.R.2d 361]) are distinguished because they involved life 
insurance policies which contained exceptions if death re-
sulted from suicide. Postler v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 Cal. 1 
[158 P. 1022], relied upon the Dennis case without noting 
that the Dennis case involved a life insurance policy; Mah 
See v. North American Ace. Ins. Co., 190 Cal. 421 [213 P. 
42, 26 A.L.R. 123], was an action upon a life insurance policy 
as vvas Hmtsh v. Pacific States L1Je Ins. Co., 2 Cal.App.2d 
14 [37 P.2d 741]. As nearly as can be ascertained from the 
majority opinion, so far as the burden of proof is concerned, 
the following cases are overr1tled: Mah See v. North Amer-
ican Ace. Ins. Co., 190 Cal. 421 [213 P. 42, 26 A.L.R. 123] ; 
Denn1:s v. Union Jltlut. Life Ins. Co., 84 Cal. 570 [24 P 120] ; 
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Bebbington v Cal'ifornia 1V estern States Life Ins. Co., 30 
Cal.2d 157 [180 P.2d 673, 1 A.L.R.2d 361}; Postler v. Trav-
elers' Ins. Co., 173 Cal. 1 P. . IImtsh v. 
States Life Ins. Co., 2 Cal.App.2d 14 P.2d , is dis-
approved. Apparently, the rule is now to be that the burden 
of proof is to be on plaintiff to prove that an exception to 
the policy did not occur to cause the death in an accident 
policy and upon the defendant where a life insurance policy 
is concerned. I say, "apparently," because it is not clear 
whether the burden is to be the same so far as both types 
of policy are concerned. 
It is interesting to note that the majority opinion will have 
the effect of overruling sub silentio many other California 
cases: It is also interesting to note that of the cases relied 
upon for the proposition that the burden of proof was not 
upon the defendant, only one is a California case (Kellner v. 
Travelers' Ins. Co., 180 Cal. 326 [181 P. 61]). The other 
cases relied upon for that proposition are New York Life 
Ins. Co. v. Garner, 303 U.S. 161 [58 S.Ct. 500, 82 L.Ed. 726, 
114 A.L.R. 1218] (a life insurance policy case arising in 
Montana and involving the question of accidental, or suicidal, 
death); TravelM·s' Ins. Co. v. Wilkes, 76 F.2d 701 (a case 
arising in Florida and involving a life insurance policy and 
the question of accidental, or suicidal, death); and a New 
York case-Whitlatch v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 149 N.Y. 
45, 58 [ 43 N.E. 405]. Other cases relied on are from Utah, 
Arizona and Wisconsin. . 
In view of the medical testimony that there was no evidence 
of "injury," I agree with the beneficiaries that the meaning 
of bodily injury under the policy should have been given to 
the jury. It is my opinion that the instructions given were 
conflicting and confusing and weighted in favor of the in-
surer. The evidence was in direct conflict. The insured was 
dead; there were no signs of outward "injury." According 
to the medical testimony the insurer's medical expert testified 
that the insured coU:ld not have died of pneumonia because 
the clothing was not disarranged. .As I have pointed out, 
physical exhaustion would leave no outward signs, nor, in 
all probability, would death from exposure to the elements. 
I believe that in a case of this type, the instructions should 
be fairly and concisely given ; that when they are as confusing 
and conflicting as they are in the case at bar, no good purpose 
may be served by endeavoring to reconcile them in order to 
reach a result. I feel, too, most strongly that California cases 
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should not be overruled and strained constructions placed 
upon other cases in order to reach a desired result. As I 
stated at the beginning of this dissent, it is impossible to 
distinguish the Brooks case from the one at bar, and any 
attempt to do so can lead to nothing but confusion. 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 7, 
1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22811. In Bank. Mar. 12, 1954.] 
MORGAN A. STIVERS et al., Appellants, v. DEPART-
MENT OF EMPLOYMENT et al., Respondents. 
[1] Unemployment Insurance-Excluded Employments-Agricul-
tural Labor.-Services performed by packing-house labor con-
stitutes "agricultural labor" within meaning of Unemployment 
Insurance Act (Stats. 1935, p. 1226, as amended; 3 Deering's 
Gen. Laws, Act 8780d), excluding such labor from operation 
of act, only if services are performed in employ of owner or 
tenant of farm on which materials in their raw or natural 
state are produced and if such services are carried on as an 
incident to ordinary farming operations as distinguished from 
commercial operations. (See Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 22, § 43, 
amending rule 7.1 of Department of Employment.) 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Exclttded Employments-Agricultural Labor.-Part-
ners owning citrus groves and a packing-house which serves 
public to extent of 20 per cent of its total fruit-packing oper-
ations, the remaining 80 per cent coming from partners' own 
groves, cannot avoid commercial aspect of packing-house and 
their consequent liability for unemployment contributions on 
premise that principal purpose of such house is to facilitate 
marketing of crops from their own groves; the test under 
Unemployment Insurance Act for determining whether activ-
ities of their. employees is agricultural is not principal purpose 
of enterprise, but whether services performed by employees 
are carried on as an incident to ordinary farming operations. 
[3] !d.-Excluded Employments- Mode for Determining.-Pro-
visions in Unemployment Insurance Act (Stats. 1945, pp. 1486, 
2230; see Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 22, § 42) for segregation of 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp (1950 Rev.), Unemployment Relief 
-Insurance Act, § 16. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-4] Unemployment Insurance, § 15. 
